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Tax Neutrality: Illusion or Reality? 





This paper shows that taxes which are understood to be neutral with respect to the marginal 
investment decisions may be distortionary with respect to entrepreneurial decisions. In 
particular, we apply an intertemporal model to show that a comprehensive income tax is 
distortionary unless all kinds of income are subject to the same tax rate and a worker's option 
to become an entrepreneur is accounted for. Similarly, the harsh condition of a uniform tax 
rate is necessary but not sufficient under "new view" dividend tax, cash flow tax, and ACE 
tax, so that the occupational choice is not distorted. In any case, informational problems may 
arise and lead to distortive effects. 
JEL Code: H25. 
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For quite some time, the theoretical work on capital income taxation focused
on under what conditions a tax system preserves investment neutrality. The
idea of taxing corporate cash ￿ow suggested by Brown (1948) and Smith
(1963) was developed into a practical tax reform proposal by the Meade
Committee (1978). It became understood that there are various ways of
making the return on marginal investment tax-free. The notion of investment
neutrality of dividend tax was subsequently introduced in the spirit of the so-
called new view of equity ￿nance and developed by various authors (Auerbach
(1979), Bergstr￿m and S￿dersten (1977), Bradford (1981) and King (1977)).
As in the case of cash ￿ ow tax, it was shown that dividend tax falls on the
company value, not on the marginal investment returns. It turned out that
such investment neutrality can be cast in a general condition, known as the
Johansson-Samuelson Theorem (see Sinn (1987)): If all capital income is
subject to a uniform marginal tax rate and if the tax depreciation coincides
with true economic depreciation, the present value of the marginal cash ￿ ow
is left unchanged by the imposition of the tax.
Echoing the ingenious tax theorem of Boadway and Bruce (1984), in 1991
the IFS Capital Taxes Group proposed the introduction of the Allowance for
Corporate Equity (hereafter ACE), in UK corporate taxation. According to
this proposal, the corporate tax base should be equal to the ￿rm￿ s current
earnings net of: i) an arbitrary tax allowance for capital depreciation (not
necessarily the cost of economic depreciation) and ii) the opportunity cost
of ￿nance. Moreover, it should ensure a symmetric treatment of pro￿t and
loss. According to the IFS proposal, the opportunity cost of ￿nance should
be equal to the default-free interest rate, thereby making the government "a
sleeping partner in the risky project, sharing in the return, but also sharing
some of the risk" (Devereux and Freeman, 1991, p.8). Under the ACE system
the ordinary return, approximating the opportunity cost of new equity capital
at the margin, is exempt at the corporate level: this leads to investment
neutrality.
As witnessed by the US Report of the President￿ s Advisory Panel on Tax
Reform (2005), the debate on alternative tax options is intense. The Panel
proposed two alternative tax schemes: the Simpli￿ed Income Tax (SIT) Plan,
which is a comprehensive income tax, and the Growth and Investment Tax
(GIT) Plan, which entails the taxation of cash ￿ ow at a business level, and
also requires the taxation of dividends, capital gains and interest received
1(thus including normal income) at a personal level.
In this article, we claim that any of the above discussed tax formats -
though neutral around the steady state of a mature company - are distor-
tionary in another important margin, i.e., at the stage of a start-up ￿rm.1 As
is well-known, the economics of a start-up ￿rm is rather di⁄erent from the
economics of a mature company. What we show here is that neither of these
discussed and celebrated tax systems can possibly be neutral at the stage of
enterprise formation, unless the overall tax burden on entrepreneurial lifetime
income is equal to the overall tax burden on labor income. Unfortunately,
this is a special case that is unlikely to hold in any real tax system. Though
our result can easily be proven, we think that it needs to be taken up to be
delivered into the literature.
Our view is particularly valid in the context of an occupational model. We
examine the issue further in the case where uncertainty makes it necessary
also to consider timing, i.e., when the decision to start an entrepreneurial
career is subject to an irreversible sunk cost. We then prove that, under
a comprehensive income tax, the entrepreneurial choice is delayed unless
the double taxation of income capital is eliminated and ad hoc deprecia-
tion allowances are ensured. We also demonstrate that uniform taxation is
necessary even under cash-￿ ow and ACE taxation in order for neutrality to
hold. However, we will also show that these tax conditions are hard or even
impossible to implement, because of informational problems.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an insight to
a simple model with no uncertainty. Section 3 introduces an intertemporal
model which describes the e⁄ects of taxation on entrepreneurial choices by a
representative agent when uncertainty shapes the value of the entrepreneur-
ial career. Section 4 extends the model introduced in the previous section,
by assuming that the representative entrepreneur has an option to quit the
business sector and re-enter the labor market. Section 5 warns against simple
policy implications from models of mature ￿rms.
1The burden of dividend tax on initial equity injection and the growth path of a ￿rm
was examined by Sinn (1991). He did not, however, address the occupational choice issue
which is our starting point.
22 The basic intuition
The prevailing view of entrepreneurship builds on the occupational choice of
heterogenous individuals, indexed by i. People are considered to take ratio-
nal economic decisions on their career choices. The theoretical and empirical
work has identi￿ed a number of di⁄erences characterizing these careers. The
entrepreneurial career is subject to entry costs, risks, and to di⁄erent tax
principles when compared with workers who enter the labor market. What-
ever these di⁄erences are, we denote the pre-tax value of the entrepreneurial
career by V (with potential options to optimize entry and exit) and the life-
time utility of a worker by O. We assume ￿rst that individuals make their
career choices right at the start of the life-cycle with no option to delay. We
assume moreover that people are homogenous as workers, but di⁄er in terms
of their entrepreneurial abilities, ai: Then, by de￿nition @V (ai)=@ai > 0. If
the total life-time tax liabilities from operating a ￿rm as an entrepreneur, or
alternatively, being a worker are denoted by T and Tw, the entry condition
under risk neutrality can be stated as
V (a
m) ￿ T = O ￿ Tw; (1)
where am denotes the ability of the marginal entrepreneur. Individuals with
ai ￿ am choose entrepreneurship, individuals with ai < am become workers.
Given (1), we can thus say that enterprise formation depends on total tax
liabilities, rather than on marginal tax rates at various income levels. In
particular, given the life-time tax liability of a worker, Tw; an increase in
the tax liability on the entrepreneurial career a⁄ects the amount of start-up
enterprises in the economy,
@a
m=@T > 0:2 (2)
The non-neutrality result shown in (2) holds for any kind of tax on an entre-
preneurial income, regardless of its potential neutrality with respect to in-
come from the marginal capital on the growth path or around to the steady
2We notice that in a more complicated model it is not necessarily the case that an
increase in the tax on entrepreneurship leads to fewer entrepreneurs. For example, it is
well-known that the entrepreneurs can hide better their income than can workers from the
tax authorities. With a higher tax rate, their incentive to do so might increase resulting
in increased market entry as an entrepreneur.
3state. Tax neutrality for occupational choices holds only if the tax rates
satisfy a particularly harsh requirement in terms of tax liabilities, T = Tw:3
Therefore, even a comprehensive income tax is distortionary if the dou-
ble taxation of capital income makes the total tax rate exceed tax on wage
income. Under a comprehensive income tax without double taxation at a
personal level, neutrality is carried over to the case of occupational choice,
only on condition that the option values of the entrepreneur have been prop-
erly considered. As we will show, they must also include the option to quit
the business activity.
Many entrepreneurial choices are dichotomous. In line with Devereux and
Gri¢ th (1999), therefore, whenever an agent faces a discrete choice between
two or more mutually exclusive projects, it is the average rather than mar-
ginal e⁄ective tax rate which matters. Therefore, when the proponents of the
"new view" of the dividend tax, the cash ￿ ow tax, the Johansson-Samuelson
tax, or the ACE-tax claim to the neutrality of these taxes, they have in mind
a di⁄erent margin. This amounts to a situation where an established ￿rm
with some pre-invested capital is undertaking a marginal investment. While
all those taxes are neutral with respect to the marginal investment decision,
they typically distort the entrepreneurial entry decision. Even the Johansson-
Samuelson tax distorts against the enterprise formation if the overall e⁄ective
tax rate (arising typically in the case of double taxation) exceeds the total
tax rate on labor income. We have been unable to locate this view in the
literature.4
This means that, in terms of occupational choice, the e⁄ective average
tax rate rather than the marginal one matters. This apparently innocuous
result has crucial policy implications, in that it implies that many celebrated
tax systems fail to be neutral in terms of entrepreneurship, unless harsher
conditions are met. As we will see, however, many existing tax systems
are distortive for the entrepreneurial choice, since they are characterized by
progressive and/or double taxation.
3We interpret here the value of the entrepreneurial career to include any business
options arising during the career.
4Neither did the Meade Committee (1978) discuss this case. The idea of neutrality
of dividend tax has been challenged recently by Henreksson and Sanandaji (2004) and
non-neutrality has been stated by Kanniainen, Kari and Yl￿-Liedenpohja (2005, 2007),
but otherwise it has been overlooked.
43 The intertemporal model
In this section, we apply an intertemporal real-option model to study the
e⁄ects of taxation on an individual￿ s career choice.5 We consider an agent
who ￿rst enters the labor market earning the market wage w per unit of time.
However, he has some business ideas that develop according to a stochastic
process (to be introduced below). Once he is su¢ ciently convinced that the
value of his business project exceeds some threshold level, he quits the labor
market and establishes an own start-up ￿rm. We ￿rst consider the case
where the commitment to an entrepreneurial career is permanent. In the
following section, we will analyze the case where the individual subsequently
has an option to quit entrepreneurship and re-enter the labor market. The
requirements for tax neutrality are then reconsidered in these cases.
For simplicity, we assume that the agents are risk-neutral6 and in￿nitely-
lived.7 Moreover, we introduce the following:
Axiom 1 at time t = 0 the individual is a worker, earning an exogenous
wage w, and is endowed with an option to start an entrepreneurial activity;
Axiom 2 to undertake a risky activity, the individual must pay a sunk start-
up cost I;
Axiom 3 after entry, the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ at time t, de￿ned as ￿t, is stochastic
and moves according to the following process:
d￿t
￿t
= ￿dt + ￿dzt with ￿0 > 0; (3)
where ￿ is the growth rate, ￿ is the instantaneous standard deviation of d￿t
￿t ;
and dzt is a Wiener process.
Assumptions 1 to 3 deserve some comments. For simplicity the assump-
tion 1 states that the pre-tax wage rate is exogenously given. As we let the
5The model here described draws on Panteghini￿ s (2007a, Ch. 3) model.
6In doing so we will disregard the insurance e⁄ect played by taxation, extensively
discussed by the relevant literature (after the pioneering article by Domar and Musgrave
(1944)).
7This simplifying assumption does not a⁄ect the quality of results. For a discussion
see, e.g., Panteghini (2007a).
5individual decide not only whether but also when to become an entrepreneur,
this means that he is endowed with a call option.8
When the individual decides to become an entrepreneur, thus exercising
the option, he loses his wage and, according to assumption 2, must pay I,
which accounts for consultancy and administrative costs representing the
strike price of the individual￿ s option. It is worth noting that, whereas entry
fees are observable,9 a relevant part of entry costs may be unobservable. As
pointed out by Djankov et al. (2002) bureaucracy delays may be dramatic
and therefore their cost may be high.10 Moreover, they may greatly vary from
one individual to another, thereby causing heterogeneity, and preventing a
precise measurement of entry costs.
According to assumption 3, the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄follows a stochastic process,
described in (3) by a geometric Brownian motion. It is worth noting that
the drift parameter ￿ measures a worker￿ s entrepreneurial ability: namely,
the higher the parameter ￿, the higher is the probability that our agent
undertakes an entrepreneurial career successfully.11
Using these assumptions we calculate the pre-entry value function of
the worker, de￿ned as O(￿t), and the (post-entry) ￿rm value, denoted by
V (￿t). In particular, the pre-entry value function is equal to the current
wage (namely, the wage received in the short interval dt) plus the remaining
value, that is the value function after the instant dt has passed. De￿ning r as
the relevant risk-free interest rate, and applying dynamic programming (see
Panteghini, 2007a) we obtain:12
O(￿t) = wdt + e
￿rdt￿ [O(￿t + d￿t)]; (4)
where ￿ [:] is the expectation operator. Following the same procedure we can
write the post-entry value function as
V (￿t) = ￿tdt + e
￿rdt￿ [V (￿t + d￿t)]: (5)
8Since this option can be exercised at any future instant, it is an American call option.
For further details, see McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986).
9For a cross-country comparison of entry fees and procedures see World Bank￿ s (2008)
report Doing Business 2008.
10Djankov et al. (2002) also show that beaurocracy delays vary among countries.
11In line with section 2, we could generalize our analysis by considering a set of potential
entrepreneurs, each with his own ￿, i.e., with his own entrepreneurial skills. However, the
quality of results would not change.
12Under risk neutrality, the contingent claim analysis and dynamic programming lead
to identical investment rules (Niemann and Sureth (2005)).
6Using (4) and (5) we can calculate the ￿rm￿ s trigger value ￿￿; above which the
entrepreneurial choice is pro￿table for an individual. For simplicity, hereafter
we will omit the time variable.
3.1 Comprehensive income taxation and the Johansson-
Samuelson Theorem
According to the well-known Schanz-Haig-Simons (hereafter, SHS) de￿nition
of income, the tax base must be comprehensive: in other words, it must
include all income from production factors, such as labor, capital and non-
reproducible factors (e.g., land, raw materials), net of expenses incurred in
earning income. The idea underlying the SHS scheme is that the income tax
base must be as close as possible to the true net income. Therefore, any
change in the ￿rm￿ s net worth must be taken into account. Advocates of
this tax argue not only that it is desirable in terms of fairness, but also that
it is neutral for investment decisions. Indeed, according to the well-known
Johansson-Samuelson Theorem (JST),13 if all kinds of capital are subject to
the same marginal tax rate and ￿scal depreciation allowances coincide with
economic depreciation, then investment strategies are una⁄ected by taxation.
To analyze the e⁄ects of a SHS comprehensive income tax on entrepre-
neurship, let us denote OJS(￿) and V JS(￿) as the before- and after-entry
value functions, respectively. Moreover, following the JST, the before-entry






respectively. We can note that even with no physical depreciation, an individ-
ual￿ s value function can change over time, because of the stochastic process
(3). In particular, the value of a worker￿ s option to enter the business sector
appreciates if cash ￿ ow increases and depreciates if it decreases. Finally, we
must remember that under a comprehensive income tax, all kinds of capital
(including interest income) must be subject to taxation; therefore the rele-
vant discount rate is (1 ￿ ￿)r. De￿ning ￿w and ￿ as the wage and business
tax rate, respectively, we can thus prove that:
13The JST is the joint result of Johansson￿ s (1961, 1969) and Samuelson￿ s (1964) ￿nd-
ings. For a discussion of the JST see e.g. Sinn (1987, Ch. 5).
7Proposition 4 Two conditions are needed for the entrepreneurial choice to
be una⁄ected by taxation, ￿rst ￿w = ￿, and second, a depreciation allowance
has to coincide with the economic depreciation of the worker￿ s option to be-
come entrepreneur.
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to Proposition 4, uniform taxation is not su¢ cient to ensure
entrepreneurial neutrality. In line with Niemann (1999), we have shown
that neutrality holds in a real-option setting only if all sources of income,
including changes in a taxpayer￿ s portfolio of real option, are subject to
taxation. This implies that a neutral income tax system also requires the
deduction of economic depreciation related to the worker￿ s entrepreneurial
option. Otherwise, a distortion arises (see Alvarez and Kanniainen (1997)).
Proposition 4 has two important implications. First, it states that a
uniform tax is necessary (but not su¢ cient) to ensure neutrality at the entry
stage. This means that no double tax can be levied; otherwise, taxation
discourages entrepreneurship. This result contradicts the new view of equity
￿nance according to which a dividend tax is neutral. The intuition behind
our result is simple: many well-known tax proposals (e.g., based on the new
view) hold only for mature ￿rms. We know, however, that most ￿rms are
not in a steady state but rather on their expansion or contraction paths, not
to mention ￿rms which are not yet created. For start-up and future ￿rms,
the neutrality of the dividend tax breaks down for the reasons discussed in
the context of the comprehensive income tax and the JST.
A second implication regards information requirements. According to
Proposition 4, a comprehensive income tax is neutral if a depreciation, i.e.,
￿Odt = ￿dOJS (￿); is allowed for workers. However, entrepreneurial ability,
and thus the option value, varies from one worker to another. This means
that due to the heterogeneity of workers, an informational problem arises. In
the absence of market prices, it is fairly hard (or even impossible) to evaluate
a worker￿ s option,14 and therefore to measure his depreciation allowance. The
problem arises from the existence of an information asymmetry where workers
are the agents and the government is the principal. In such a context, an
individual would be clearly induced to overstate his own entry option in order
to reduce his before-entry tax burden.
14Notice that these option are not tradable.
83.2 Cash-￿ ow and ACE taxation
Let us next study two alternative consumption-based systems: a standard
cash-￿ ow tax and an ACE-type one. In both cases, interest income (i.e.,
normal income) is exempt, and therefore, the relevant discount rate is r.
Cash-￿ ow tax Under cash-￿ ow tax, the di⁄erence between receipts and
outlays is taxed at, say the tax rate ￿ at any instant t: In this case, the
after-tax cash ￿ ow will be equal to:
￿
CF = (1 ￿ ￿)￿: (8)
Note that under cash-￿ ow tax, the investment cost I must be fully deducted
when it is undertaken. The after-tax cost is therefore equal to (1 ￿ ￿)I.
ACE tax Under ACE tax, the entrepreneur￿ s payo⁄, ￿, is taxed at rate ￿,
and, at any time period, a portion ￿ of the investment cost I is deductible
from current tax base where ￿ measures the cost of ￿nancing.15 Thus tax
payments are equal to
T (￿) = ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿I): (9)
Given (9), the ￿rm￿ s after-tax cash ￿ ow will then be
￿
ACE = ￿
CF + ￿￿I: (10)
Using dynamic programming we can write an agent￿ s before-entry value
function as:
O






with j = CF;ACE: (11)








￿1; with j = CF;ACE: (12)
15Boadway and Bruce (1984) assume that a representative ￿rm is ￿nanced with both
debt and equity. According to their tax system, the ￿rm can deduct the total cost of
capital, i.e., the market rate of interest, r, times the ￿rm￿ s capital, K, so that it can
deduct rK from the tax base. Here, we have assumed for simplicity that the ￿rm is fully
equity-￿nanced. Thus, ￿ should be interpreted as the opportunity cost of equity. However,
the quality of results would not change if we assumed an optimally-debt ￿nanced ￿rm (see
Panteghini, 2007b).
9As shown in (12), the worker￿ s value function consists of two terms: the
present value of after-tax wages,
(1￿￿w)w
r ; and A
j
1￿￿1; which measures his
(call) option to enter the business sector. In particular, A
j
1 is an unknown to
be determined and ￿1 > 1:










with j = CF;ACE: (13)













It is worth noting that the relevant discount rate is given by the di⁄erence
between the risk-free interest rate r and the drift ￿. By using the adjusted
discount rate (r ￿ ￿) we thus account for the expected increase in ￿. As
shown in (14), the individual￿ s value function is a perpetual rent. This is due
to the fact that, after entering the business sector, the individual is assumed
not to make any further decisions.
Functions (12) and (14) allow us to deal with an individual￿ s intertem-
poral decision. The individual￿ s problem is one of choosing the optimal en-
trepreneurial timing, which can be associated with a trigger point ￿￿;j. This
means that, whenever the current income reaches ￿￿;j, the individual starts
his business activity. As shown in Appendix D, we obtain the trigger points












































￿;j￿1￿￿1 > 0; with j = CF;ACE. (17)
As can be seen in (15) and (16), the entrepreneur￿ s trigger points ￿￿;j
can be a⁄ected by tax rates ￿w and ￿. Given these results we can say that:
10Proposition 5 The timing decision of the entrepreneurial career is unaf-
fected by taxation if:
1. under cash-￿ow taxation, ￿w = ￿;
2. under ACE-type taxation, ￿ = r; and ￿w = ￿:
As shown by Proposition 5, uniform taxation is a necessary and su¢ cient
neutrality condition under cash-￿ ow taxation. In any case it implies that
a ￿rm￿ s income cannot be taxed twice (i.e., both at the corporate level and
at the personal level), otherwise, neutrality fails to hold. This result has an
interesting policy implication: i.e., neutrality is ensured by a Hall-Rabushka
￿ at tax (Hall and Rabushka (1995)) that entails the taxation of cash ￿ ow only
at the ￿rm level as well as uniform taxation. On the contrary, a distortion
arises under the US Panel￿ s GIT proposal, since this tax design entails a
double taxation of capital income.16
Let us focus on the ACE proposal. In line with Devereux and Freeman
(1991) and Bond and Devereux (1995), Proposition 5 states that neutrality
can be achieved if ￿ = r; i.e., if the tax treatment of the sunk cost I is
equivalent to that ensured by a cash-￿ ow tax.17 However, Proposition 5 also
requires that we must also have ￿w = ￿. This means that an ACE-type tax
is distortive in terms of start-up decisions, if business income is subject to
double taxation. In particular, the lower the tax rate ￿w and/or the higher
the tax rate ￿; the higher the trigger point ￿￿;ACE is. It is worth noting that
double taxation was not excluded by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991).
On this point, e.g., Devereux and Freeman (1991, p. 8) argued that the ACE
can "operate in a classical relation with the personal tax system, so that, in
administrative terms, it will function with any form of personal taxation".
We can see that, however, entrepreneurship is discouraged if ￿w < ￿.
Let us ￿nally say, that under both systems, an implementation issue may
arise because entry costs are partially unobservable. Like comprehensive
16Similarly, a distortion would also arise under Bradford￿ s (1986) X tax. Under the
Bradford proposal, indeed, labor income would be subject to a graduated-rate tax, and
therefore, tax rates might di⁄er from one taxpayer to another. This would violate the
uniform-tax-rate condition.
17Brown (1948, p. 537) argues that distortions "can be substantially eliminated by a
system which permits the ￿rm to deduct either (1) current outlays (or an average of outlays
for a short period) on depreciable assets or (2) normal depreciation on total assets". See
Niemann (1999) and Panteghini (2001a, 2001b) for details on investment neutrality in a
real-option framework.
11income taxation, an information asymmetry may arise, and therefore, cause
a distortion for entry decisions.
4 Entry and the option to quit
Let us next analyze the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship when the
individual also has an option to quit his business activity and re-enter the
labor market.18 For simplicity, we assume that re-entering the labor market
is an irreversible choice. We also introduce the following:
Axiom 6 If the individual re-enters the labor market he faces an exit cost
equal to E.
Exit costs are at least partially unobservable. Indeed, parameter E may
account for on-the-job-search costs under unemployment.19 It is realistic to
think that the higher the unemployment rate is, the higher the parameter E
is, and therefore the more costly it is to re-enter the labor market.20 Hence
assumption 6 allows to deal with labor market ￿ exibility; in other words, the
higher the cost E, the less ￿ exible the labor market is. As we will see, the
e⁄ects of taxation may crucially depend on the characteristics of the labor
market.
Exit costs also account for liquidation procedures, which are time-consuming,
costly, and may vary from one case to another.21 Moreover, we must consider
that our entrepreneur had already abandoned the labor market to undertake
his business venture. Therefore, he may have lost employment protection, as
well job bene￿ts etc. In particular, health bene￿ts ￿nanced by the employer
are lost when the worker leaves. Yet, a worker might have paid the bene￿t
in his wage which should in equilibrium capitalize such bene￿ts. If not, loss
of the bene￿ts results in an exit cost which works against entrepreneurship.
There may be other exit costs like the need to move to another location, the
18This implies that the entrepreneurial choice is now partially reversible. Since the
individual faced a sunk cost when he entered the business sector, reversibility cannot be
full.
19These costs may dramatically di⁄er from an individual to another (see e.g. Card et
al. (2007)).
20This is in line with Bruce (2002) who found that unemployment discourages exit.
21For a cross-country analysis of exit costs see World Bank￿ s (2008) report Doing Busi-
ness 2008.
12loss of co-workers as friends. As will be shown, the option to quit increases
enterprise formation in the ￿rst place.
Given assumption 4, we can calculate the worker￿ s post-exit value function





4.1 Comprehensive income taxation
We de￿ne ￿ as the percentage of deductibility of exit costs. Therefore, the




￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿w)E: (19)
As can be seen, (19) is given by a perpetual rent because, after re-entering
the labor sector, an individual owns no option to change his status.
Given (19) we can prove the following:
Proposition 7 Three conditions are required for the entrepreneurial choices
to be una⁄ected by income taxation: i) ￿w = ￿, ii) ￿ = 0, and iii) a depreci-
ation allowance coinciding with economic depreciation.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 7 represents a generalization of Proposition 4. As can be seen,
no deduction is needed for the exit costs; it is indeed su¢ cient to set ￿w = ￿
in order for exit to be undistorted by taxation. Given Propositions 4 and
7 we can say that implementation problems regarding income taxation are
due to the impossibility of appropriately measuring the value of a worker￿ s
entry option. On the other hand, the tax treatment of exit does not cause
any implementation problem per se.
4.2 Cash-￿ ow and ACE taxation
Under cash-￿ ow and ACE taxation, a worker￿ s function has the following
form:
22Since, by assumption, re-entering the labor market is an irreversible choice, the worker








￿1 with j = CF;ACE: (20)
Notice that the option value B
j
1￿￿1 di⁄ers from the term A
j
1￿￿1 of function
(12), in that it accounts for the higher degree of ￿ exibility, namely the value
of the (put) option to quit.
Since the entrepreneur can now decide to close his business activity and













2 ￿￿2 under ACE:
(21)
If we compare (21) with (14), we have now the additional term H
j
2￿￿2, which
measures the individual￿option to quit and to re-enter the labour market.
Unlike the case analyzed in section 3 -where we applied the boundary con-
dition V j(0) = 0 and thus set H
j
2 = 0-, in this case, the individual will ￿nd
it optimal to quit for V j(￿) > 0. Since condition V j(0) = 0 does not hold,
we now have HT
2 6= 0.
Following the same procedure we can write the worker￿ s value function




￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿w)E: (22)
Given (12), (21) and (22) we can now analyze an individual￿ s decisions.
Solutions are found backwards: we will ￿rst ￿nd the optimal exit point e ￿j
and then calculate the entry trigger point ￿￿￿;j, for j = CF;ACE. As shown














































2 > 0; we can calculate the entrepreneur￿ s option to exit H
j
2￿￿2.
As can be seen, the trigger point e ￿j is positively a⁄ected by the labor wage
rate: i.e., the higher the wage, the higher the propensity to quit is. It is
worth noting that e ￿CF > e ￿ACE. Under the ACE system indeed, the exit
threshold point is reduced by the tax bene￿t
￿
r￿I: Since such a bene￿t is
lost whenever the individual decides to quit his business activity, he will be
induced to delay the exit decision. Therefore, the higher the tax bene￿t ￿￿I
is, the lower the point e ￿j is, and the lower the probability of exit is.
In order to analyze the e⁄ects of taxation we use (24) and set ￿w = ￿ = 0,










Using (24) and (25) we can say that:
Proposition 8 Under cash-￿ow taxation, the exit decision is una⁄ected by
taxation, i.e., e ￿CF = e ￿LF if ￿w = ￿; and ￿ = 1: Under ACE taxation, even
if ￿ = r, ￿w = ￿, and ￿ = 1, the inequality e ￿ACE < e ￿LF holds.
According to Proposition 8, a uniform cash-￿ ow tax is no longer neu-
tral in terms of exit decisions unless exit costs are fully deductible. As we
have pointed out, however, exit costs are at least partially unobservable; this
means that, given information problems, the implementation of a neutral
cash-￿ ow tax is de facto impossible.
Under ACE taxation the above conditions are not su¢ cient. Comparing
(24) with (25) we immediately see that e ￿ACE = e ￿LF; only if a rebate R =
￿
r￿I
is granted. In particular, if we set ￿ = r, the neutral rebate is R = ￿I, which
coincides with the cash-￿ ow tax bene￿t ensured by immediate write-o⁄ of
I.23 Otherwise, the entrepreneur is induced to delay exit.24
23Notice that a distortion may also arise if losses are carried forward at the risk-free rate,
but future positive revenues are not su¢ cient to use all tax credit (see Ball and Bowers
(1983)).
24To our knowledge, among articles dealing with tax neutrality, only Panteghini (2006)
has focused on exit. His article shows that, under default risk, a S-based system distorts
the decision to default (that is, the exercise of the option to quit the business activity by
existing shareholders).
15Let us next analyze the optimal entry decision. As shown in Appendix









































































Despite the fact that (26) is not a closed-form solution, we can compare ￿￿￿;j

















holds, the comparison of (15) and (16) with (26) allows to conclude that
￿￿;j > ￿￿￿;j: This means that the exit option, that depends on labor market
characteristic, a⁄ects entry decisions. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward: the ability to exit ensures some degree of business ￿ exibility.
Given partial reversibility, therefore, the cost of undertaking the business
activity is lower. This reduces the optimal threshold point.
The e⁄ect of partial reversibility on entry decisions can also be seen by
comparing (17) with (27). Given inequality ￿￿;j > ￿￿￿;j, we have (￿￿;j)
1￿￿1 <
(￿￿￿;j)
1￿￿1 : Moreover the term ￿2H
j
2 (￿￿￿;j)
￿2￿1 is negative. It is therefore




1. In other words, the existence of the option to
quit makes the worker￿ s option to start less valuable. This lower value may
explain why the option is exercised earlier, i.e., ￿￿;j > ￿￿￿;j.
Given (26), we can show that:
Proposition 9 The entry decision is una⁄ected by either cash-￿ow or ACE
taxation only if exit is undistorted.
As shown in (26), entry is a⁄ected by exit. According to Proposition
9, therefore, full neutrality is ensured only if quite restrictive conditions are
introduced; in particular, the full deduction of exit costs is necessary. As
we have pointed out, however, it is almost impossible to measure all these
costs. This implies that, due to informational problems, a neutral cash-￿ ow
or ACE tax is de facto not implementable.
165 Concluding remarks
Our paper has highlighted that the idea of income tax neutrality is more often
an illusion than reality. It has produced results which carry a frustrating
message for tax economists not to mention policy-makers. This paper has
shown that a number of well-known neutral systems of taxing income from
existing corporations with little expansion prospects typically distorts the
economic decisions both at the start-up and at the liquidation stage. In
our view, the trouble with previous tax analyses has been that they have
been based on overly simpli￿ed models focusing on long-term equilibrium.
Enterprises however, typically have a life-cycle. No enterprise can be created
as a mature company. Each enterprise has a beginning and may have a
death. Furthermore, given the high heterogeneity of (observable) entry and
exit costs among countries (see World Bank (2008)), we can say that the
implementation of a given tax system may have an impact that dramatically
di⁄ers from one country to another. It is not of secondary importance to
understand in what way is the life cycle of enterprises a⁄ected by business
and labor taxation.
17A Proof of Proposition 4
Given the before-entry depreciation allowance ￿O, a worker￿ s tax base is equal
to25
B = w ￿ ￿O: (28)
Using (28) and applying dynamic programming, we can write the worker￿ s
value function as:
O







Expanding the RHS of (29) and applying It￿￿ s Lemma gives:
OJS(￿) = [(1 ￿ ￿w)w + ￿w￿O]dt
+[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)rdt]
￿
OJS(￿) + dOJS (￿)
￿
+ o(dt); (30)


















@￿ , and OJS
￿￿ =
@2OJS(￿)
@￿2 : Substituting (31) into (30) gives










Following Samuelson (1964), and using (6) we have
￿Odt = ￿dO













Using (31) and rearranging (32) gives
(1 ￿ ￿)rO













If ￿ = ￿w, the non-arbitrage condition (33) reduces to
rO









25The depreciation or appreciation refers to a worker￿ s productivity or skill as an entre-
preneur.
18Let us next turn to the ￿rm￿ s value function. Under a comprehensive
income tax system, the ￿rm￿ s tax base is equal to
￿
JS = ￿ ￿ ￿V: (35)
Using (35) and applying dynamic programming we can write the ￿rm￿ s
project value as:
V







Expanding the RHS of (36), and applying It￿￿ s Lemma gives the following
di⁄erential equation













@￿ , V JS
￿￿ =
@2V JS(￿)


























Using (34) and (38) we can show that the non-arbitrage condition of the



























is una⁄ected by taxation. This means that the entrepreneurial decision is
undistorted by a uniform-rate comprehensive income tax.
B The calculation of (12)
Let us expand the RHS of (11) and apply It￿￿ s Lemma to obtain
O






























@￿2 : Substituting (40) into (39) gives
O
























As shown by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), equation (42) has the following gen-
eral closed-form solution
O
















￿i(￿i ￿ 1) + ￿￿i ￿ r = 0: (44)

































Given these results, we can next calculate A
j
2. It is worth noting that when
￿ goes to zero it will remain zero in the geometric Brownian motion.26 This
26Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch. 5) provide further details on this point.






Notice that, given ￿2 < 0; if ab absurdo A
j







and the condition (45) would fail to hold. This implies that we must set
A2 = 0: Equation (12) is thus obtained.
C The calculation of (14)
Let us expand the RHS of (13) and apply It￿￿ s Lemma to obtain
V
j(￿) = ￿






















@￿2 . Simplifying (46) gives
rV
j(￿) = ￿
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i ￿￿i under ACE;
Let us next calculate H
j
i for i = 1;2. As regards H
j
2; we know that ￿ = 0 is an
absorbing barrier and that the condition V j(0) = 0 holds. This implies that
H
j
2 = 0: To calculate H
j
1 we recall Dixit and Pindyck￿ s (1994) explanation
according to which the term H
j
1￿￿1(￿) may be referred to speculative bubbles.
In the absence of bubble, we have therefore Hi
1 = 0. We have thus obtained
(14).
21D The optimal entry timing
To ￿nd the optimal trigger point, ￿￿;j, above which entry is pro￿table we
apply the Value Matching Condition (VMC) and the Smooth Pasting Con-
dition (SPC). The VMC requires the equality between the present value of
the project, net of the investment cost, and the value of the option to delay
investment, at point ￿ = ￿￿;j, namely:
V
j(￿
￿;j) ￿ I = O
j(￿
￿;j) with j = CF;ACE: (48)
The VMC (48) implies that when the option is exercised optimally (i.e., at
point ￿ = ￿￿;j) the entrepreneur receives a net payo⁄ equal to V (￿￿;j) ￿ I.
The SPC requires the equality between the slopes of [V j(￿) ￿ I] and
Oj(￿) at point ￿ = ￿￿;j, i.e.,












The SPC (49) equates the marginal bene￿t of entrepreneurship (on the LHS)
and the marginal cost of exercising the option (on the RHS), that is the
marginal cost of losing business ￿ exibility. Substituting (12) and (14) into
(48) and (49) and solving gives (16) and (17).
E Proof of Proposition 7
As shown by Proposition 4, neutrality in terms of entry holds only if ￿w = ￿,
and economic depreciation of the worker￿ s option to become entrepreneur is
deductible. To prove neutrality in terms of exit, it is thus su¢ cient to show
that the same rule must hold for the after-exit value function.





￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿w)E: (50)
By setting ￿ = ￿w and ￿ = 0; (50) collapses to (18). Given this result and
Proposition 4, we can thus say that the joint application of uniform taxation
and economic depreciation ensures tax-rate invariance. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 7.￿
22F Optimal exit timing under consumption-
based taxation
To ￿nd the optimal exit point, we substitute (21) and (22) into (48) and (49).
Under cash-￿ ow taxation we have
























Under ACE taxation we have the following two-equation system:


























Solving the systems (51)-(52), and (53)-(54) for H
j
2 and e ￿j, with j = CF;ACE,
gives (23) and (24), respectively.
G Optimal start-up timing with the option
to quit
The optimal start-up timing is obtained by substituting (20) and (21) into





















































Next solve (55) and (56) for ￿￿￿;CF and BCF
1 . Similarly, solve (57) and (58)
for ￿￿￿;ACE and BACE
1 . We thus obtain (26) and (27).
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